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CASES NOTED
murder' 7 to which the defendant has interposed the defense that an act
other than his own caused the death.' 8 This rule has no application until
the state has proven a sufficient cause of death. 19  The rule of law that
once the state has shown a sufficient cause of death, a rebuttable presump-
tion arises, 20 should mean only that the defendant has the burden of going
forward with the evidence.
In the instant case, defendant was charged with involuntary man-
slaughter and did not contend that death was due to any cause other than
that alleged by the state. Therefore, it is submitted that the rule, since it is
applicable for mitigating purposes only, was wrongfully applied to the instant
case. If the court meant to imply that the state had sufficiently proven the
cause of death to raise a presumption, the words "burden of proof" should
not have been used. Since from the record it appears that the state suffi-
ciently proved the death by competent evidence, the use of the rule was
superfluous.
EVIDENCE-REFUSAL OF FEDERAL COURT TO ENJOIN ADMIS-
SION OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN STATE COURT
Plaintiff was indicted for bookmaking in violation of a New Jersey
statute.' He sought an injunction' in a United States district court to
restrain the prosecutor from using illegally obtained evidence in the state
criminal proceeding. Held, on certiorari, that federal courts should refuse
to intervene in state proceedings to suppress the use of evidence, even when
claimed to have been secured by unlawful search and seizure. Stefanelli v.
Minard, 72 Sup. Ct. 118 (1951).
Prior to 1914, it was generally recognized that in a criminal proceeding
any court would receive evidence, whether legally or illegally obtained,3 if
otherwise competent. The courts rationalized that to hold otherwise would
involve the raising of collateral issues.4 In Weeks v. United States5 how-
ever, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction which was based on evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search by a United States marshal. The Court
17. Until the instant case, the words "with murderous intent" were included in the
rule. E,g,, Bellamy v. State, 56 Fla. 43, 57 So. 868 (1908); State v. Briscoe, 30 La.
An. 433 (1878).
18. State v. Briscoe, 30 La. An. 433 (1878).
19. Ibid.
20. United States v. Wiltberger, 28 Fed. Cas. 727, No. 16,738 (E.D. Pa. 1819).
1. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2:135-3 (1939).
2. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946); 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1946).
3. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met.
329, 337 (Mass. 1841); People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351 (1903); Bishop Atterbury's
Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 323, 495 (1723); 3 WICoRE', EVIDENCE §§ 2183, 2264 (3d ed.1940).4. See, e.g., Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (appeals from "final deci-
sions of the district courts"7 .
5. 232 U.S. 383 (194).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
declared that such searches and seizures were in contravention of the Con-
stitution.6 It asserted, however, that the Constitution affords no protection
from such searches by non-federal police officers.
Since 1914, the courts of forty-six states have ruled on the question of
whether the doctrine of the Weeks case should be applied in state trials.
In twenty-nine states the doctrine has been rejected;8 in seventeen it has
been followed." In the recent leading Supreme Court case of Wolf v. Color-
ado, ' a 4-3 decision, the majority concluded that in a state prosecution for
a state crime, the Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid the admission of
evidence, even if obtained by an illegal search and seizure.
Although it would be contrary to the Constitution" for a state to sanc-
tion such police incursion into privacy,' 2 unless the answer to the constitu-
tional question is indispensable to the disposition of the cause, the court
will not decide the matter.'3 In an effort to maintain the balance between
state and federal powers, the Court, in using its discretionary privilege, re-
fused to grant equitable relief in the absence of a finding of "irreparable
injury which is clear and imnm inent.' 4  It further concluded that a con-
viction, even though based on illegally obtained evidence, would not deprive
petitioner of due process of law.' 5 The Supreme Court is reluctant to lay
down a rule which would open the door for counsel to resort to a federal
forum to determine issues arising out of procedural due process.'0
In view of the fact that petitioner had not attempted to obtain an
injunction in the state court to suppress the use of the evidence,' 7 and that
lie merely anticipated its use,' 8 the holding, based on the Court's discretion-
ary power to refuse to intervene, appears to be sound. However, the dis-
senting opinions in the Wolf" and instant20 cases are persuasive in their
argument that to hold that the illegally obtained evidence is admissible
and that its use may not be enjoined, is to make the Fourth Amendment
an "empty and hollow guarantee so far as state prosecutions are concerned."'' 2
6. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
7. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
8. Ala., Ariz., Ark., Calif., Colo., Del., Ga., Kan., La., Me., Md., Mass., Minn.,
Neb., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Ore., S.C., Tex., Utah, Vt.
and Va.
9. Mla., Idaho, Ill., Ind,, Iowa, Ky., Mich., Miss., Mo., Mont., Okla., S.D.,
Tenn., Wash., W. Va., Wis. and Wyo.
10. 338 U.S. 25 (1948).
11. U. S. CONST. AN rD. XIV.
12. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1948).
13. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
14. Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
15. See note 10 suPra.
16. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (admission of a confession); Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (selection of a grand jury); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932) (failure to appoint counsel); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)
(selection of a petit jury).
17. Poughe v. Patton, 21 F. Supp. 182 (D.C. Tex. 1938).
18. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932).
19. Id. at 40 (J.J., Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge, dissenting).
20. Stefanelli v. Minard, 72 Sup. Ct. 118, 123 (Justice Douglas dissenting).
21. Id. at 123.
